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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REQUIRING
TELEPHONE COMPANIES TO PROTECT THEIR
SUBSCRIBERS FROM TELEMARKETING CALLS
James A. Albert*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article focuses upon the privacy implications when tele-
phone companies sell their subscriber lists to telemarketers. It con-
siders the developing, but rarely acknowledged relationship between
the telephone companies and telemarketing and concludes that this
relationship strongly implicates the privacy right of telephone sub-
scribers and is, therefore, ripe for governmental regulation. The arti-
cle also rejects the assumption that such regulation is unconstitu-
tional and then offers a remedy to those who demand a restoration of
their telephones as instruments of convenience, rather than
annoyance.
II. THE PROBLEMS
In the United States, more than 300,000 direct marketing sales-
people currently make some 18 million telephone calls per day to
private homes and businesses.' These calls, which generally arrive
during the evening when most prospective customers are at home,
are routinely objected to by approximately eighty-two percent of
their recipients.' The calls can be loud, jarring, and disruptive in
* Professor of Law, Drake University Law School and Of Counsel, Michael J. Galligan
Law Firm, P.C., Des Moines, Iowa. B.F.A., Drake University, 1971; J.D., Notre Dame Law
School, 1976. Formerly, Attorney-Advisor, Federal Communications Commission, Washing-
ton, D.C.
The opinions expressed herein are the author's. Professor Albert gratefully acknowledges
the exemplary research provided for this article by Gerald Ruleman, David Marner, Jeanie
Vaudt, Nina Pearlmutter, Sharon Malheiro, Carolyn Mondschean, and Michael Briggs, grad-
uates of the Drake University Law School, and Charles Randall, a second-year law student at
the Drake University. Law School.
1. Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, § 2(3), 105 Stat.
2394, 2394 (1991).
2. Barry Meier, Intruder on the Phone: Ending a Sales Talk Before it Begins, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 3, 1990, at 48.
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their urgent summoning of people to the phone to impose whatever
sales pitch the person or machine on the other end desires to commu-
nicate. Nearly everyone leaps and runs when commanded by a tele-
phone. Even one suicidal jumper, already on the ledge of a building
and ready to leap several stories to his death, reportedly crawled
back into the building just to answer a telephone that began
ringing.'
For the purposes of this article, the definition of telemarketing
is an uninvited solicitation by telephone from someone with whom
the recipient has no prior business relationship. It explicitly does not
include, for instance, the use of the telephone by a local department
store to alert a customer that an ordered product has arrived or simi-
lar consensual business uses.
The use of automated dialing and recorded message players
(hereinafter ADRMPs) exacerbates the typical annoyance potential
of telemarketing firms. No larger than a typewriter, these robot di-
alers are potent and can each access more than one thousand homes
per day with their pre-recorded sales pitches.' ADRMPs are rela-
tively inexpensive as they retail for as little as $300, and allow
telemarketers to prospect blindly for sales at breakneck speed.'
Telemarketing firms cannot buy enough of the machines, which are
manufactured by more than thirty different companies.6
Unattended and automatic, ADRMPs are really computer con-
nected telephones that store tens of thousands of telephone numbers.7
An auto-dialer serially dials the home telephone numbers listed on
the computer system and plays a pre-recorded message; when the
pre-recorded message ends, the auto-dialer dials the next number
and continues the cycle. While a boon to telemarketers, ADRMPs
have caused several problems for private citizens.
Because many of the auto-dialers do not disconnect the line
when the recipient of the call hangs up, the auto-dialer blocks any
use of the phone line, including emergency telephone calls, until the
pre-recorded message concludes. The dire consequences of an auto-
dialer were very poignantly exemplified when an auto-dialer pre-
3. MYRON BRENTON, THE PRIVACY INVADERS 176 (1964).
4. Thorn Kupper, Call for Regulation; Congress Targets Automated Phone Pitches,
NEWSDAY, Sept. 4, 1991, at 41.
5. Paul Farhi, Lawmakers Prepare Message to 'Junk' Phone Solicitors; Complaints
Prompt Moves to Curb Industry, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 1989, at CI1.





vented a Michigan family from calling an ambulance after its father
suffered an unexpected and sudden injury.' After investigating the
problems with auto-dialers, the Los Angeles Times reported that
ADRMPs routinely overload switchboards at hospitals, and even
cited one example in Colorado where auto-dialer machines overtook
all incoming lines to a hospital and commanded the hospital opera-
tors to listen to "the following important message." 9
In the hands of an unscrupulous operator, an auto-dialer can
wreak havoc in a community. In 1988, Des Moines, Iowa hair stylist
Jerry Feick purchased an auto-dialer, pre-recorded three different
thirty-second messages advertising his hair styling business and his
man-to-man dating service, programmed the machine to crank out its
maximum 2,000 calls every twenty-four hours and left it on around
the clock.'" Feick calibrated his ADRMP to call local numbers with
a Drake University prefix. As a result, Feick roused hundreds of
college and law students out of bed in the middle of the night during
final exam week. Feick's auto-dialer subjected the students to
messages such as, "If I had hair as ugly as yours, I'd call Jerry
Feick, hair stylist, immediately" and, "Are you lonely and looking
for someone to romp with on your waterbed?"'1 Feick admitted that
he was aware of the Drake University final exam schedule, acknowl-
edging that, " 'I knew that they'd be in their dorms studying,' and
available to receive the messages. '"12
His machine also reached throughout Iowa's capital city, in-
cluding patients' rooms at two local hospitals as his auto-dialer went
through all the telephones at those institutions. 3 When reporters
asked Feick to respond to the frustration and irritation of local resi-
dents who were called around the clock, Mr. Feick blithely told re-
porters: "I don't care ... ."" Because the use of such auto-dialers
were neither prohibited nor regulated by any federal or state statute,
Mr. Feick received only weak penalties for his harassment and can
continue his calling. 5 As he saw it, he had an absolute constitutional
8. Kupper, supra note 4, at 41.
9. Michael J. Ybarra, Computer-Driven Sales Pitches; Up to Their Ears in Junk,
Phone and Fax Users Say, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1989, at 1.
10. Tom Carney, Phone Dialer Reaches Out and Annoys People, DES MOINES REG.,
Jan. 15, 1988, at IM.
11. Victoria Benning, D.M. Hairstylist Vows to Fight Latest Legal Snag, DES MOINES
RE;., Apr. 7, 1988, at 3M.
12. Carney, supra note 10, at IM.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Benning, supra note 11, at 3M.
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right to freedom of speech and a right to conduct his business as he
wanted. As for those law students studying for exams, Feick bristled
they "all think they're F. Lee Baileys,""6 and he vowed never to
accede to their threats. In fact, he forewarned that he would
purchase an even more sophisticated auto-dialer, listing at $8,000,
that could make up to 200,000 telephone calls a day.17
Most telemarketers who arm themselves with auto-dialers are
not as malevolent as Mr. Feick. The other thousands of them, ac-
cording to syndicated columnist Judith Martin ("Miss Manners"),
are just rude. As Miss Manners sees it, the use of an auto-dialer is
the equivalent of "breaking into somebody's house." 8 The difference
is that an ADRMP, unlike a burglar, does not even need a house.
Following the 1989 San Francisco earthquake, a homeowner survey-
ing the damage to his leveled house heard his telephone ringing from
underneath a pile of rubble. He searched through the debris, found
the phone and lifted the receiver to his ear only to hear a loud and
clear prerecorded sales message courtesy of an auto-dialer.1 9
High tech consumer fraud has also evolved from modern
telemarketing methods as large scale scams are easily facilitated by
new technologies. Faceless "boiler room" con artists (a phone bank
sweat shop operated by a platoon of salespeople armed with Wide-
Area Telecommunications Service (hereinafter WATS) lines and
phony pitches) can victimize unwary consumers far easier by phone
than in person. Typically, the con artist telemarketers describe bogus
companies with phony investment schemes. The schemes may prom-
ise riches in rare coins, artwork, precious metals, and oil and gas
finds to the unsuspecting. However, such schemes rarely delivers
upon their promised riches.
During the 1980's, for instance, consumers paid more than
$500 million for fake Dali prints that were first forged and then sold
by phone.2" Over a four-year period, Fort Lauderdale telemarketers
bilked $75 million by phone from people in their homes by promis-
ing to sell bars of gold bullion; in truth, the telemarketers sold pieces
of wood painted gold and stored in a Florida vault.2" Given the tens
of thousands of calls that can be made from a boiler room, the con
16. Carney, supra note 10, at IM.
17. Id.
18. Smith, supra, note 6, at 42D.
19. Kupper, supra note 4, at 41.
20. Telefraud: They've Got Your Number, CONSUMER REP., May 1987, at 290 [herein-
after Telefraud].
21. Id. at 291.
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artists find an appreciable number of unwary and unsophisticated
consumers each day. The practice is so successful that Consumer Re-
ports magazine calculated that dishonest boiler room telemarketers
bilk consumers out of $1 billion each year in phony investments.22
Telephone fraud remains widespread despite the efforts of
states like Florida and California to crack down on boiler room op-
erations, telephone fraud remains widespread today. The Federal
Trade Commission's Bureau of Consumer Protection reported in
1991 that it was "seeing more solicitations that look like a prob-
lem,"2 4 especially involving travel scams that offer free airfare and
other gimmicks. One 1991 telephone hustle offered consumers a
ground floor opportunity to earn a sixteen percent return by invest-
ing in the nascent cable television industry in the former Soviet
Union.15  In April 1991, Visa and Mastercard sued several
telemarketing companies that sold "low interest credit cards" for a
processing fee that ranged from seventy to two-hundred dollars. The
telemarketers charged the fees to preexisting credit cards and pro-
vided the takers with a readily available, and typically free, list of
banks that charged twelve percent interest on their credit cards."'
Thirty-two boiler room operations in Los Angeles, Dallas and
Salt Lake City used the Persian Gulf War to bilk $50 million out of
private citizens for phony oil and gas investments.27 Scott Stapf, of
the North American Securities Administrators Association (a securi-
ties fraud monitoring group), explained that, "There aren't any illu-
sions about telemarketing fraud going away,"2 [because given the
link that the telephone provides to virtually every home in the coun-
try] . . . [t]here's an almost unlimited supply of potential victims for
schemes." 29
22. Id. at 289. See also Janice Castro, Reach Out and Rob Someone, TIME, Apr. 3,
1989, at 38; Marlys Harris, You May Already Be a Victim of Fraud, MONEY, Aug. 1989, at
74; Laura M. Litvan, Telephone Scams are Multiplying, Coalition Warns, WASH. TIMES,
Jan. 26, 1990, at Cl; Jane Bryant Quinn, Why Tele-Crooks Are Still on the Line, WASH.
Posr, Mar. 25, 1990, at Hll.
23. Telefraud supra note 20, at 293.
24. Cathy Lynn Grossman, 'Free' Airfare Scams Taking Off, USA TODAY, Sept. 5,
1991, at 5D.
25. Thomas Watterson, Con Men Let Their Fingers do the Dirty Work, BOSTON
GLOBE, May 9, 1991, at 55.
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III. THE UTILITY OF TELEMARKETING
The vast majority of telemarketers are certainly honest. Despite
the fact that the telemarketing industry is subject to intense criticism
from some consumers for invasions of privacy and the potential for
fraud, the industry is very successful. In the last twenty years,
telemarketing became the largest direct marketing medium in the
country,30 used far more by sellers than the U.S. Mail or in-person
solicitation.
While some surveys indicate that as many as eighty-six per cent
of those receiving evening telemarketing calls object to such an inva-
sion of their privacy, fourteen percent apparently are not offended
and will consider purchasing products sold over the telephone."
This mere fourteen percent is actually an enormous market consider-
ing that telemarketing reaches millions of homes each year.
Telemarketers reaped $120 billion in sales-in 1986,2 the most recent
year for which statistics are available. On top of that, one out of
every fourteen people called by an auto-dialer bought the product
being sold.3
Interestingly, telephone companies are among the most exten-
sive users of telemarketing; a little known fact. 4 The telephone com-
panies are enticed into using telemarketing by telemarketing's poten-
tial to reach vast numbers of consumers quickly, cheaply, and
successfully. Giant long-distance companies like AT&T, U.S. Sprint,
and MCI use telemarketing to sell their services to millions. 5 Re-
gional and local telephone companies, from Wisconsin Bell to Penn-
sylvania Bell, employ telemarketers to merchandise such optional
services to their customers as call waiting, call forwarding and speed
dialing.3
Telemarketers working for MCI make seven million calls each
month to households on behalf of that company.3" Eugene
Eidenberg, MCI's Executive Vice President, boasts, "We have used
30. Michael R. Violanti, International Telemarketing; Media Management, DIRECT
MARKEITING MAG., Apr. 1990, at 24.
31. Survey Shows Thumbs Down for Telemarketing, UPI, Sept. 1, 1989, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
32. Id.
33. The Right of the Called, CHRISTIAN SCi. MONITOR, June 10, 1988, at 15.
34. Telephone Interview with Lee Larschied, President, Iowa Telemarketing Associa-
tion (Feb. 1, 1991).
35. Jay Mallin, Phone 'Slam' Ire Growing, Firm Says, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1990, at
CI0.
36. Telephone Interview with Lee Larschied, supra, note 34.
37. See Mallin, supra note 35, at C10.
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telemarketing quite aggressively and quite successfully." 3 The three
major national long distance carriers are intensely competitive, and it
is telephone bank against telephone bank as those companies log mil-
lions of calls fighting for the long distance market.
Some of those telemarketers, trying to pry customers from their
existing carrier, actually record sales and switch services without the
customer's permission. The practice, known as "slamming," is so
widespread in the phone banks that Bell Atlantic, the regional phone
company serving the Washington, D.C., area, predicted that MCI
will slam 80,000 of its customers in one year.39
The fierce competition between telemarketers for long distance
customers reached a pinnacle in 1990 when AT&T sued MCI and
its telemarketing agents, Pioneer Teletechnologies, Inc., in a New
Jersey federal court alleging "unfair and deceptive telemarketing
practices and the switching of customers' long-distance service with-
out their permission."4 MCI retorted that AT&T was just "whin-
ing [because it was] frustrated about losing market share,"4 a and
counter-sued AT&T for the same offense.42 A year later, however,
the companies reached a quiet settlement and dismissed their suits,
amid industry speculation that neither wanted to risk having its se-
cret telemarketing techniques exposed during trial.43
Allegations of telephone telemarketers' overreaching have not
been limited to the competition for long distance dollars. In 1989, for
example, Wisconsin Bell was fined $1.2 million by the state Public
Service Commission for telemarketing abuses within that state.44
IV. THE TELEPHONE COMPANIES' FINANCIAL STAKE IN
TELEMARKETING
The telephone companies profit at every stage of the telemarket-
ing cycle. They place the consumer in a vice and themselves in a
conflict of interest concerning the privacy of their subscribers by
working both sides of the street.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Suit Filed, NEW JERSEY LAW J., Jan. 25, 1990, at 10.
41. Id.
42. Fear of Exposing Marketing Secrets May Have Killed AT&T - MCI Lawsuit,
LONG DISTANCE L'tr-ER, Jan. 1991, at 7.
43. Id.
44. Gary Miller, State Seeks Further Regulation of Phone Company Telemarketing,
Bus. J. MILWAUKEE, Sept. 11, 1989, at 14.
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A. At Home
Local and long distance telephone companies have many oppor-
tunities to bill their customers for home telephone use. For example,
different telephone companies either sell or lease telephones to citi-
zens for use in their homes. For each telephone, local service compa-
nies charge a monthly service fee for the privilege of making and
receiving local calls, while a long distance provider charges subscrib-
ers for long distance calls.
The phone company can even reap an additional fee by offering
unlisted telephone numbers, for an additional charge, to those cus-
tomers concerned with their privacy.
B. In the Phone Bank
Similarly, telephone companies profit from telemarketers in a
myriad of methods. As with residential users, telemarketers either
purchase or lease the telephones that they use directly from the tele-
phone companies. Monthly service fees are charged by the local com-
panies. Long distance carriers profit from every long distance call a
telemarketer makes, charging them for either WATS lines or
straight long distance time by the minutes and hours used.
Local, regional, and long distance phone companies generate
additional income by using telemarketers to contact citizens to sell
them long distance packages or local service add-ons. To make the
calls, some phone companies employ their own in-house
telemarketers while others retain outside specialists.45
Several local independent telephone companies actually enter
formal business partnerships with telemarketers. Telemarketing cen-
ters are constructed with the phone companies typically contributing
fifty percent of the cost of the boiler rooms while the profits are then
divided between the phone companies and the telemarketers."'
Local telephone companies also sell lists of their subscribers'
numbers to telemarketers and other businesses.47 Armed with such
lists, solicitors can easily program their auto-dialers without han-
dling cumbersome directories.
45. Telephone Interview with Lee Larschied, supra note 34.
46. Id.
47. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1286 (1991); see,
e.g., Telephone Directory Reproduction Rights Tariff, § 5.7.4 of Schedule Cal. P.U.C. No.
A5 (Feb. 16, 1988) (the Pacific Bell tariff provision permitting the company's sale of names
and telephone numbers of its subscribers); see also Mark S. Nadel, Rings of Privacy: Unsolic-
ited Telephone Calls and the Right of Privacy, 4 YALE J. REG. 99, 119, n.119 (1986).
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Yet, the public is generally unaware of the extent of the phone
companies' financial interest in telemarketing. The fact that tele-
phone companies are making money at both ends of the millions of
calls has simply not been prominently reported or publicly debated
by the federal and state regulators who have been investigating
telemarketing practices for the past several years. This financial in-
termingling should be promptly disclosed to the public.
So, too, should the potential of the following additional phone
company money-maker: phone companies that are forced to protect
the privacy of their paying subscribers from telemarketers can charge
for that, too.
V. AN IRRITATING IRONY-TEI.EPHONE COMPANIES CHARGE
SUBSCRIBERS TO PROTECT THEIR PRIVACY
In response to the drumfire of protest from hundreds of
thousands of outraged citizens, state and federal legislators and regu-
lators, have attempted to solve the problem in a variety of ineffective
ways.4 A primary stumbling block has been a false belief that
telemarketers have a constitutional right to engage in any type of
business practice. This article will attempt to debunk such a mis-
taken premise.
VI. THE LEGISLATORS' AND REGULATORS' RESPONSES AND
SOLUTIONS
Neither state legislatures, state public utility commissions, the
U.S. Congress nor the Federal Communications Commission has
fully exercised its powers to regulate the telemarketing industry.4 9
More than half of the states have enacted limited restrictions on
telemarketing activity.5" Most fall far short of effectively shielding
unwilling recipients from being called. State regulations have taken
three basic forms-attempting to protect the unwilling citizen from
the calls to begin with, forcing telemarketers to be more polite when
they do call, or making it difficult for a con artist to defraud someone
by phone.
Examples of the first type include the asterisk laws in Oregon
48. See JULIE CROCKER, TELEMARKETER'S GUIDE TO STATE LAWS 1-25 (1988); see
also In the Matter of Unsolicited Telephone Calls, 77 FCC.2d 1023 (1980).
49. See Note, Unwanted Telephone Calls A Legal Remedy? 1967 UTAH L. REV. 379
passim (1967); CROCKER, supra note 48, at 1-25; Unsolicited Telephone Calls, 77 FCC.2d
1023.
50. Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (1991).
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and Florida, and the Massachusetts regulation which requires phone
companies to keep a list of consumers who don't want to receive
autodialed calls.5" The second approach, taken in Texas, has been to
ban ADRMP calls after 9:00 p.m., force the caller to disclose the
name of the company making the call and to require that
telemarketers "make every effort not to call consumers who ask not
to be called again."52 The third course, taken by Kansas, focuses on
telefraud and not on privacy. A 1991 Kansas statute voids all verbal
agreements between a telemarketer and a consumer for the purchase
of goods or services unless it is later memorialized in a written con-
tract with complete disclosure of the full purchase price and the
name, address and telephone number of the telemarketer who sold
the product.53
Yet, there are significant limitations inherent in each approach.
List keeping requirements are ineffective because many
telemarketers simply do not use telephone directories-they either
purchase computer lists of numbers for different areas or program
their auto-dialers to call numbers randomly and sequentially. 4 Also,
whether it is because of the cost involved or their own skepticism
about its effectiveness, few consumers are paying to participate in the
asterisk programs. 5 The law leaves everyone else unprotected.
While Massachusetts requires phone companies to compile lists of
those who do not want to be called, it does not require telemarketers
to ask the phone companies for that list before firing up the phone
banks.
56
While the politeness rules alleviate some peripheral annoyances,
they still permit the prime abuse-telemarketers calling people who
don't want to be disturbed by phone sales pitches. Many consider
telemarketing calls to be inherently impolite, regardless of attendant
niceties like caller identification. 57 Finally, the Kansas policy of fo-
cusing on fraudulent telemarketers ignores the privacy rights of the
greater number of citizens who don't want to be bothered in the first
place and who would not consider buying anything from a
51. Meier, supra note 2, at 48.
52. Terry Brennan, Texas Telemarketing Bills Allow Turning Off of Violator's Phones,
DIRE(T MARKEFTING NEWS, June 17, 1991, at 11.
53. Terry Brennan, New Kansas Law Requires Contract And Price Disclosure on
Tele-Sales, DIRECT MARKETING NEWS, June 3, 1991, at 4.
54. Foes of Junk Calls' Go Into Action, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Mar. 27,
1978, at 67.
55. Meier, supra note 2, at 48.
56. Id.




At the federal level, the Federal Communications Commission
declined to restrict telemarketing practices in 1980 after a two year
study of the issues raised by more than 4,000 consumers' complaints
about unsolicited calls and auto-dialers.58 The Commission's inaction
was based on the following determinations: that an outright ban on
those calls would violate the Constitution, that an alternative ap-
proach permitting subscribers to request that they not receive such
calls would be too costly and difficult to enforce, and that even im-
posing time, place and manner restrictions on telemarketers was un-
necessary because the agency didn't believe there were widespread
abuses at the interstate level and read its jurisdiction as not ex-
tending to intra-state calls.59
The FCC's constitutional analysis was flawed and the reading
of its own enabling act was far too restrictive. It should also be noted
that the Commission completely underestimated the extent of the
problem, was insensitive to the privacy interests that subscribers
were asserting, failed to recognize that vast changes in telephone
technology were already outpacing already existing regulation and
was rapidly turning the telephone into an instrument of real annoy-
ance to millions of Americans.
The agency's refusal to act in 1980 led directly to a prolifera-
tion in the use of ADRMPs, which itself changed the face of the
telemarketing industry and brought millions more homes within the
reach of telemarketers.60
Indeed, its blinders were exposed when it concluded "we de-
cided not to propose restrictions on ADRMP equipment because
ADRMPs do not appear to be in widespread interstate use and are
not causing network congestion or other substantial problems at the
present time."61 First, ADRMPs are particularly and extensively
used interstate. The classic telemarketing operation, in 1980 and
currently, is a telephone bank of WATS lines and auto-dialers lo-
cated in one state and spraying thousands of calls simultaneously
across several states.62 The technological acumen of phone banks to
58. In the Matter of Unsolicited Telephone Calls, 77 FCC.2d 1023, 1023 (1980). See
generally Comment by Institute for Public Interest Representation, Georgetown University
Law Center (which made a compelling argument for Commission regulation and included an
erudite analysis of the relevant constitutional issues).
59. Unsolicited Telephone Calls, 77 FCC.2d at 1024-25.
60. James Barron, Junk' Phone Calls: Danger on the Line? N.Y. TIMES, May 21,
1988, § J, at 36.
61. Unsolicited Telephone Calls, supra note 58, at 1025.
62. Telefraud, supra note 20, at 291.
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reach across geographic expanse has even escalated to the point that
large phone banks located in Panama and Costa Rica can rapidly
send calls throughout the United States. 3 Beyond that, the FCC's
finding that the ADRMPs weren't a problem simply because they
had not adversely affected the telephone companies' networks reflects
the agency's failure to recognize that the real problem of telemarket-
ing is its potential to disrupt the peace and quiet of millions of aver-
age American citizens.
In response to constituent pressures, Congress enacted the Tele-
phone Consumer Protection Act of 1991.4 Representative Edward
J. Markey, the chief sponsor of the House version of the bill, ex-
pressed the feelings of most members: "I believe that telemarketing
can be a powerful and effective business tool, but the nightly ritual
of phone calls to the home from 'strangers' and 'robots' has many
Americans fed up."65 Signed into law by President Bush on Decem-
ber 20, 1991, the law went into effect exactly one year later.6
The Act addresses both ADRMPs and human telemarketing,
and is harsher on the former. Although ADRMPs are not banned,
their use is restricted and such calls can be made only to households
expressly consenting, for emergency purposes, or if the FCC enacts a
rule in 1992 exempting certain types of ADRMP calls from the
Act's restrictions.67 Telemarketers have already recognized that the
new law can be circumvented by employing live operators who
would ask recipients if they would agree to hear a recorded mes-
sage." Given that loophole, the prior consent limitation is questiona-
ble because it would simply not avoid an unwanted call. With re-
spect to telemarketing generally, the Act directs the FCC to enact
regulations within nine months to protect the privacy rights of resi-
dential telephone subscribers.69 In doing so, the Commission is to
evaluate alternative approaches, including a national "do not call"
list, restrictions based on telephone network technology and tele-
phone directory markings.7 ' The Act clearly favors a national "do
63. Watterson, supra note 25, at 61.
64. Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, § 2(3), 105
Stat. 2394 (1991).
65. Lindy Skrzycki, Lawmakers Put Nuisance Calls On Hold to Some Phone Lines;
Consumers Must Give Prior Consent to Firms, WASH. PosT, Nov. 28, 1991, § D, at 13.
66. James A. Reiman, The True Meaning of the 'Do Not Call' Bill, DIRECT" MARKET-
ING NEws, Jan. 27, 1992, at 14.
67. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1) (1992).
68. Reiman, supra note 66, at 14.
69. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(2).
70. Id. § 227(c)(1)(A).
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not call" database and permits the FCC to determine how to cover
the cost. 1 Implicit, however, is the understanding that the Commis-
sion can assess such costs against subscribers who wish to be placed
on the list. Nonprofit, charitable and political organizations are ex-
empted from any FCC rule under the Act, including an opt-out list,
although the use of ADRMPs by those groups is subject to the same
restrictions as commercial businesses. 2
As Richard A. Barton, the senior Vice President of the Direct
Marketing Association, assessed the law from the industry
perspective:
[tihe bill . . . was not perfect, but it does give telemarketers
some breathing space and a first-class chance to mold the na-
tional regulation that may affect them. As a result of this legis-
lation, the Federal Communications Commission will be the fo-
cal point for most national telemarketing issues in 1992, which
is much better for direct marketers. (And, I expect, for our
customers.)7 3
Given the timidity that the FCC has previously demonstrated in
this area, and its belief that the First Amendment precludes strong
regulation, Mr. Barton is probably correct in his assessment.
The congressional action was tempered by its acceptance of the
argument that its options were limited by the Constitution. The
House and Senate rejected proposed legislation to impose more ex-
tensive restrictions on telemarketers, and passed a more moderate bill
after communications committee members such as Senator Hollings
(D. South Carolina) expressed concerns about hampering the free
speech rights of telemarketers.74 During debate on the legislation,
Senator Pressler focused on the First Amendment delicacies of regu-
lating telemarketers and placed in the record a Chicago Tribune edi-
torial warning that stronger regulations would "probably run afoul
of the Constitution as well."
'7 1
The new law leaves charities and political organizations unfet-
tered, plenty of loopholes for telemarketers to continue to use
71. Id. §§ 227(c)(3)-(4).
72. Id. § 227(a)(3).
73. Richard A. Barton, Some Good Did Come Out of 1991, DIRECT MARKETING
NEWS, Dec. 23, 1991, at 16.
74. Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, House Says, 'Sorry, Wrong Number' to Telephone Sales,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 1991, § B, at 1; Skrzycki, supra note 65, at 13.
75. 137 CONG. REC. S18,786 (daily ed. Nov. 27, 1991) (quoting Putting Limits On
Autodialers, Cm. TRIB., Nov. 22, 1991, at 24, introduced into the Record by Sen. Larry
Pressler).
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ADRMPs, and a hesitant FCC as the final arbiter of the morass.
The failure of government to act more forcefully is compounded
by the absence of any stiff self-regulation by the telemarketing in-
dustry. For instance, the Direct Marketing Association (telemarket-
ing's most prominent trade organization) which supported several of
the more cautious regulatory approaches suggested by different
members of Congress and has even developed its own national do-
not-call list, has rejected numerous more extensive restrictions. 6
In the absence of meaningful limitations, there has been an ex-
plosion in the telemarketing industry. The use of ADRMPs has es-
calated sharply and the number of calls has burgeoned. Consumers
have responded harshly to the telemarketing explosion. Former Col-
orado Public Utilities Commissioner Ron Lehr reported that annoy-
ing telemarketing calls were the second major source of complaints
received from citizens during his seven years on the commission.77
Ann Landers, flooded with angry letters, told one Memphis reader,
"I don't blame you for wanting to reach out and belt someone."78
Columnist Mike Royko protested in one of his columns that people
don't have to accept being interrupted and disturbed by nuisance
calls at home merely because they have telephones. 9 When
telemarketers responded that he was advocating censorship and
wouldn't like it if his own column were censored, Royko retorted: "I
don't call people while they're having dinner and read my column to
them over the phone."8"
Humorist Art Buchwald observed in 1988 that "[y]ou can't get
a law passed [against telemarketers] by Congress because most of the
legislators use junk calls to get reelected. And others make them to
raise campaign funds."'" Buchwald suggested that one way to get
Washington's attention would be for people to call their member of
Congress at home at night on several successive nights and ask them
to ban junk calls.82
76. Kupper, supra note 4, at 41.
77. Tom Locke, PUC Privacy Rules May Change Look of Telephone Book, DENVER
Bus. J., Apr. 26, 1991, § 1, at 1.
78. Ann Landers, Computer Phone Call Costs Unwilling Listener, DES MOINES REG.,
Oct. 9, 1990, § T, at 2.
79. Mike Royko, You Can Beat Junk Phone Calls, DEs MOINES REG., July 28, 1988,
§ A, at 9.
80. Mike Royko, Phone Pests Feel the Heat, DES MOINES REG., Aug. 4, 1988, § A, at
13.
81. Art Buchwald, Holding the Line on Junk Calls, WASH. POST, July 12, 1988, § D
at 1. (Buchwald was somewhat prophetic. The law Congress passed in 1991 limiting




In 1990, an enterprising Massachusetts lawyer sought the inter-
vention of the courts to protect the privacy of subscribers from ram-
pant telemarketing. Alan J. Schlesinger sued the brokerage firm of
Merrill Lynch for invading his privacy by making repeated cold calls
to his office after he had twice requested in writing that they stop."
Merrill Lynch employed 10,000 telephone solicitors, many of whom
specifically targeted attorneys and Schlesinger continued to be inter-
rupted at work by different callers on behalf of the brokerage firm.
At the trial court level, the judge was persuaded that Merrill
Lynch's conduct violated the state's privacy statute, which protected
a person's "right against unreasonable, substantial or serious inter-
ference with his privacy," '84 and entered an injunction enjoining the
firm's marketers from calling Schlesinger.
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held
that Schlesinger's privacy rights had not been violated and over-
turned the injunction, in part because Merrill Lynch only called the
complainant three to five times a year.
85
The court admonished that it was "important to recognize, as a
general proposition, that 'in an industrial and densely populated so-
ciety, some intrusions into one's private sphere are inevitable' "8e and
that "[tihe law does not provide a remedy for every annoyance that
occurs in everyday life." 8
Such hide-bound thinking has been widely accepted and has
prevented effective regulatory action by bureaucrats and legislators.
But a solution exists which would both respect the free speech rights
of telemarketers and protect those people who don't want to be pes-
tered at home by unsolicited telephone calls.
. VII. EFFECTIVE ACTION COULD INDEED BE TAKEN
Without violating the constitutional rights of telemarketers, the
Federal Communications Commission could exercise its statutory
power to regulate the interstate operations of telephone companies88
in order to require that their tariffs include specific provisions which
83. Schlesinger v. Merrill Lynch, 567 N.E.2d 912 (Mass. 1991).
84. Id. at 913.
85. Id. at 916.
86. Id. at 915 (quoting R. RODMAN, PROCEDURAL FORMS § 1051, at 491 (1990)).
87. Schlesinger, 567 N.E.2d at 915 (quoting from Kelly v. Post Publishing Co., 98
N.E.2d 286 (1951)). See also, 62A AM. JUR. 2D Privacy § 64 (1990). For another example of
the reluctance of the courts to recognize the injuries suffered by citizens seeking tranquility in
their homes, see DeAngelo v. Fortney, 515 A.2d 594 (Pa. Super. 1986).
88. 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-224 (1988).
1993]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
would shield home recipients of interstate telemarketing solicitations
from unwanted calls on request.
Every state public utility commission could also exercise similar
authority 9 and require that the tariffs of the telephone companies
within their states contain such provisions. In those ways, every tele-
phone subscriber in the country could be protected from every source
of call, whether it be from within their own state or outside it.
A tariff is a required document that telephone companies file
and which describes the company's obligations to the public. Essen-
tially, it is an agreement negotiated and entered into between the
telephone companies and the regulatory agencies, the latter acting on
behalf of the public. The tariff then becomes a contract between the
telephone companies and their individual subscribers. 90 As such, the
regulatory agencies can require that certain provisions be inserted in
tariffs for the benefit of the subscribers.
Through the tariff vehicle, a remedy can be readily fashioned to
place the responsibility for protecting subscriber privacy on the tele-
phone companies who are in the best position to do so.
This plan is particularly alluring since it is not a blanket prohi-
bition of telemarketing. Instead, it protects only those unwilling lis-
teners who choose to have the privacy of their homes or businesses
shielded from such calls, thereby allowing telemarketers to conduct
their business in those homes where they are welcomed.
Technological advances in the telephone industry have recently
invited the privacy invading problems now faced by consumers.
However, the telephone companies now have the technology to rem-
edy the problem through "exchange blocking."
"Exchange blocking" allows certain telephone numbers to be
blocked out either at the subscriber's home or at the telephone com-
pany.91 It works by installing a blocking device on a telephone line
which makes it impossible for anyone calling from that line to be
connected to a certain, proscribed number. The engineering and
mechanics were refined in the 1980's as a means for parents to deny
their children access to 900-prefix and 976-prefix "dial-a-porn"
numbers, and it indeed permitted them to block calls from their
home to specific telephone numbers they found objectionable.92 In
fact, the California Public Utilities Commission ordered Pacific Bell
89. See, e.g., MICH. CoMiP. LAWS ANN. § 460.6 (West 1991); TEX. REV. CIv. S'Ar.
ANN. art. 1446c(18) (West 1980).
90. Citizens Tel. Co. v. Telegraph Serv. Co., 214 F. Supp. 627 (W.D.N.C. 1963).
91. Carlin Communications v. FCC, 787 F.2d 846, 849, 852 (2d Cir. 1986).
92. Id. at 849.
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to block access to such telephone numbers at the request of any resi-
dential subscriber.
9 3
Exchange blocking works effectively and can easily be applied
to telemarketing. Tariff provisions could obligate telephone compa-
nies to accept "opt out" requests from subscribers at no cost and to
maintain a computerized listing of those telephone numbers which
are not to receive telemarketers' calls. In turn, the lines that tele-
phone companies provide to telemarketers, often in boiler rooms,
would be automatically blocked from calling the numbers on the opt-
out list. Exchange blocking is itself currently being enhanced and an
upgraded version, "Customer Local Area Signaling Service
(CLASS)," exists which makes blocking from a central office even
easier.4
VIII. BLOCKING TELEMARKETING CALLS WOULD NOT
VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION
It cannot be denied that the courts have consistently protected
the privacy of people in their homes from the intrusions of commer-
cial speech. Restrictions on the First Amendment rights of salespe-
ople and solicitors have long been imposed by state and local govern-
ments.95 In fact, there is a solid body of case law affirming
restrictions on commercial speech which traces the evolving means
seized by solicitors over the years to reach people in their homes.
The courts have permitted restrictions on such speech in virtu-
ally every form it has taken-door-to-door solicitation, the use of
sound trucks, picketing of private homes, handbilling, unsolicited
mailings, and radio and television broadcasting.9 Telemarketing, of
course, is simply the latest means used to reach people in their
homes. If those several means of speech can be constitutionally regu-
lated under a privacy rationale, then afortiori, the restrictions pro-
posed by this article would also pass First Amendment muster.
The courts have examined the propriety of such restrictions by
employing a traditional balancing test and applying strict scrutiny."
93. John Marshall Lipscomb v. Pacific Bell, Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n. 2d 443 (1987).
94. Carlin Communications, 787 F.2d at 852.
95. OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 523-29 (1982).
96. Id.
97. See C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62
IOWA L. REV. 1 (1976); see also Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988); Central Hudson Gas
and Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); Village of Schaumburg v.
Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980); Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S.
610 (1976); Rowan v. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1969); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S.
622 (1951); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 78 (1949); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141
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Most of the cases have arisen in the context of speakers challenging
certain limitations imposed to protect privacy rights.98 In each, the
courts have weighed the free speech rights of the speaker against the
public interest in the privacy of the home.99
IX. SIMILAR RESTRICTIONS ON OTHER FORMS OF COMMERCIAL
SPEECH HAVE LONG ENJOYED JUDICIAL FAVOR
A. Door-to-door Solicitation Can Be Constitutionally Restricted
In its 1976 decision in Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell,'° the Su-
preme Court held that narrowly drawn, content neutral restrictions
may be imposed upon door-to-door solicitation in order to protect
citizens' privacy. At issue was a local ordinance that required ad-
vance written notice to the local police by "[a]ny person desiring to
canvass, solicit or call from house to house . . . for a recognized
charitable cause ...or ...political campaign or cause ...in writ-
ing, for identification only."' '  The plaintiff, who was seeking re-
election to the state assembly from the municipality, and others,
brought suit, claiming that the ordinance unconstitutionally re-
stricted their rights of free speech.' 02 The Court ultimately struck
down the ordinance on vagueness grounds,' but in so doing, it reit-
erated that not all ordinances regulating door to door solicitation are
constitutionally objectionable:
[Tihe Court has consistently recognized a municipality's power
to protect its citizens from crime and undue annoyance by regu-
lating soliciting and canvassing. A narrowly drawn ordinance,
that does not vest in municipal officials the undefined power to
determine what messages residents will hear, may serve these
important interests without running afoul of the First
Amendment."10
(1943); National Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Rockefeller, 870 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. de-
nied, 493 U.S. 966 (1989); Curtis v. Thompson, 840 F.2d 1291 (7th Cir. 1988); Schlesinger v.
Merrill Lynch, 567 N.E.2d 912 (Mass. 1991); see also Guardian Plans Inc. v. Teague, 870
F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989) (companion case to National
Funeral Servs., Inc.).
98. See sources cited supra note 97.
99. See sources cited supra note 97.
100. Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976).
101. Id. at 611.
102. Id. at 614-15.
103. Id. at 620.
104. Id. at 616-17.
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The Hynes Court embraced the work of Professor Zechariah
Chafee in recognizing the right of individuals to be left alone in the
privacy of their homes:
Of all the methods of spreading unpopular ideas, [house-to-
house canvassing] seems the least entitled to extensive protec-
tion. The possibilities of persuasion are slight compared with
the certainties of annoyance. Great as is the value of exposing
citizens to novel views, home is one place where a man ought to
be able to shut himself up in his own ideas if he desires.
105
The Hynes opinion also quoted as authority the Court's 1943
Martin v. Struthers1"6 decision which struck down a similar ban on
door-to-door religious solicitation. In that case, the challenged
Struthers, Ohio, ordinance was held violative of the free speech
rights of those who wished to distribute literature door-to-door. The
Court reasoned that the ban constituted "the naked restriction of the
dissemination of ideas"' 7 and was too stringent to correctly serve
even the legitimate goal of protecting the privacy of unwilling
residents.'
Provocatively, Martin analysis emphatically supports the consti-
tutionality of the proposal advanced by this article. In its decision,
the Court acknowledged that the privacy and crime "dangers of dis-
tribution can be so easily controlled by traditional legal methods,
leaving to each householder the full right to decide whether he will
receive strangers as visitors ... ."19 As well, the opinion recognized
that "[tlraditionally the American law punishes persons who enter
onto the property of another after having been warned by the owner
to keep off."" '  The Court had no problem with such trespass stat-
utes, but faulted the ordinance as effectively making every visitor a
trespasser "without an explicit command from the owners to stay
away."' 111
Given this legislative power to protect the privacy of homeown-
ers who demand it, the Court actually characterized as proper a Na-
tional Institute of Municipal Law Officers proposal to make it a
105. Id. at 619 (quoting ZECHARIAH CHAFFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES
406 (1954)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1965); Samuel D. Warren
& Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890); William Prosser,
Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960);
106. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).




111. Id. at 148.
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criminal offense for a door-to-door solicitor to ring the bell of a
householder who has given notice that they do not want to be dis-
turbed. 1 2 The Court noted that, "[tihis or any similar regulation
leaves the decision as to whether distributors of literature may law-
fully call at a home where it belongs-with the homeowner himself.
A city can punish those who call at a home in defiance of the previ-
ously expressed will of the occupant . . . .""' Yet because the ordi-
nance applied to all homes regardless of whether their occupants de-
sired protection, it was found to be unconstitutional.
In the final analysis, Martin v. Struthers is powerful authority
for the constitutionality of a restriction on telemarketers which limits
their calls solely to willing recipients, or more precisely, prohibits
them from calling those who have indicated an unwillingness to be
called. The narrowness of such a regulation would insulate it from
constitutional infirmity.
As previously discussed, telemarketing fraud is a threat of epi-
demic proportion. The quick access to homes by nameless, faceless
telemarketers and equally fast retreat, by hanging up from their
boiler room sometimes several states away makes protecting the aver-
age home from telemarketing fraud even more difficult and impera-
tive than when the con artist is on foot going house to house working
a neighborhood and who can be seized by police upon complaint and
held accountable for any attempted fraud.
Even the Supreme Court's 1980 decision in Village of Schaum-
burg v. Citizens for a Better Environment,"' striking down as over-
broad a municipal ordinance prohibiting certain charitable solicita-
tions, can legitimately be read as support for a limitation upon
telemarketing activities. In Village of Schaumburg, an ordinance
prohibiting the solicitation of contributions by organizations not us-
ing at least seventy five percent of their receipts for "charitable pur-
poses" was invalidated as overbroad because the Court could not find
a substantial relationship between the seventy five percent require-
ment and the protection of public safety or residential privacy." 5 It
is a straightforward time, place and manner restriction that would
apply across the board to all speakers and is not based on the content
of what they have to say. Instead, it is based on the wishes of the
home dwellers who simply don't want to be solicited. Therefore, by
definition, this regulation would not be overbroad because it would
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
115. Id. at 638.
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not reach either protected non-commercial speech, nor would it limit
the use of the several remaining avenues of communication open to
solicitors.
The most persuasive Supreme Court pronouncement on this
point was provided in its 1951 Breard v. Alexandria opinion. " 6 In
Breard, the Court upheld a city's complete proscription of door-to-
door solicitation of magazine subscriptions by reasoning that the
householder's interest in privacy outweighed any First Amendment
rights of publishers to distribute magazines by means of uninvited
entry onto private property."'
The City of Alexandria had enacted the challenged ordinance to
protect the privacy of its citizens' homes because householders had
complained that, in some instances, "solicitors were undesirable or
discourteous and . . . whether a solicitor was courteous or not, they
did not desire any uninvited intrusion into the privacy of their
home.""' 8 The Court acknowledged that a city has the duty to pro-
tect its citizens against practices threatening their privacy and quiet,
that a householder has a right to rely on such protection," 9 and that
door-to-door salespeople do disturb the peace and quiet. 20
In addressing the rights to free speech enjoyed by businesses,
the Court reasoned:
As a matter of business fairness, it may be thought not really
sporting to corner the quarry in his home and through his open
door put pressure on the prospect to purchase. As the exigencies
of trade are not ordinarily expected to have a higher rating con-
stitutionally than the tranquillity of the fireside, responsible
municipal officers have sought a way to curb the annoyances
while preserving complete freedom for desirable visitors to the
homes.' 2 '
The Court was also particularly solicitous of the fact that the
other customary methods of solicitation, including radio, periodicals,
and mail, remained open and available to the magazine publishers in
Alexandria.' 22 The Court stated that although such methods do not
necessarily produce as much business as house-to-house canvassing,
localities were to be provided a great deal of discretion in local deci-
116. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
117. Id. at 644.
118. Id. at 625.
119. Id. at 640.
120. Id. at 626-27.
121. Id. at 627.
122. Id. at 631-32.
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sion-making in the absence of federal legislation preempting them
from prohibiting door-to-door soliciting. 23
Based on this analysis, it would not violate the First Amend-
ment to prohibit telemarketing calls to homes not wishing to receive
them if other alternative means of commercial speech to reach those
homes remained, including the mail and newspaper, magazine, radio
and television advertising.
The Court placed its imprimatur on the steps Alexandria chose
to take to eliminate the nuisance of door to door selling:
Subscriptions may be made by anyone interested in receiving
the magazines without the annoyances of a house-to-house can-
vassing. We think those communities that have found these
methods of sale obnoxious may control them by ordinance. It
would be, it seems to us, a misuse of the great guarantees of free
speech and free press to use those guarantees to force a commu-
nity to admit the solicitors of publications to the home premises
of its residents. We see no abridgment of the principles of the
First Amendment in this ordinance.1 24
In no uncertain terms, then, the Court's decision in Breard
pointedly rejects the assumption long harbored by policy makers and
legislators that the First Amendment precludes regulation of
telemarketers.
Informed by the Supreme Court opinions discussed here, the
Circuit Courts of Appeals have similarly upheld ordinances re-
straining door-to-door canvassing. In its 1988 decision in Curtis v.
Thompson, 26 the Seventh Circuit upheld an Illinois statute which
prohibited real estate agents from telephoning or visiting the homes
of residents who had previously provided notice that they did not
want to sell their homes or be solicited by any agent attempting to
list their homes for sale.
In rejecting a realtor's First Amendment challenge, the court
recognized the right of states to regulate commercial speech with
content-based restrictions "[b]ecause of the greater potential for de-
ception or invasion of privacy"1 2 6 involved in commercial speech.
The court applied the test set out in the Supreme Court's landmark
commercial speech decision, Central Hudson Gas and Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 27 which provided a four-part
123. Id. at 638.
124. Id. at 644-45.
125. Curtis v. Thompson, 840 F.2d 1291 (7th Cir. 1988).
126. Id. at 1298.
127. Central Hudson Gas and Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
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test in assessing the constitutionality of a governmental restriction
upon commercial speech. The Central Hudson test requires courts
to determine whether the expression involved is protected by the
First Amendment, whether the asserted governmental interest sought
to be achieved by the regulation is substantial, whether the regula-
tion directly advances the substantial government interest and
whether the regulation is more extensive than necessary to satisfy
that interest.
12 8
In applying the test, the Seventh Circuit found that the state's
interest in ensuring the privacy of its residents in their homes was
"strong and valid"'1 29 given that:
The right to privacy sets America apart from totalitarian states
in which the interests of the state prevail over individual rights;
moreover, the unique importance of the right to privacy in the
home has, from time immemorial, been amply demonstrated in
our constitutional jurisprudence."'
Further, the court emphasized that commercial free speech
rights are not absolute, reasoning that "[w]hen the fundamental right
to privacy clashes with the right of free expression, the interest in
privacy does not play second fiddle when the speech is merely in-
tended to propose a commercial transaction. '
In terms of the means chosen by the Illinois legislature in satis-
fying its substantial interest, the court concluded that the statute was
not too extensive given that real estate agents could still contact those
prospective buyers who had not previously expressed a desire not to
be solicited.13
2
The Central Hudson test, the one used today by the Supreme
Court to determine whether or not certain commercial speech is pro-
tected by the First Amendment, is satisfied by the regulation this
article proposes for exactly the same reasons it was in Curtis.
With similar reasoning, the Third Circuit upheld a municipal
ordinance prohibiting post-daylight door-to-door charitable solicita-
tions in its 1984 decision in Pennsylvania Alliance for Jobs and
Energy v. Council of Munhall.'3 In finding a constitutionally per-
(1980).
128. Id. at 566.
129. Curtis v. Thompson, 840 F.2d 1291, 1299 (7th Cir. 1988).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1300.
132. Id. at 1304.
133. Pennsylvania Alliance for Jobs and Energy v. Council of Munhall, 743 F.2d 182
(3d Cir. 1984).
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missible time, place and manner restriction, the court was persuaded
that the city's interest in preventing crime and protecting its resi-
dents' privacy was clearly promoted by a regulation that prohibited
uninvited solicitors from attempting to sell their wares during the
dinner hour and in the evening.134
Obviously, the application of the Pennsylvania Alliance facts
and analysis couldn't be more pertinent to those issues framed by
similar annoyances by telephone solicitors. And the teaching of all of
the cases analyzed here couldn't be clearer-if it's constitutional to
limit door-to-door solicitation, and it is, then it's constitutional to
limit telemarketing.
B. The Use of Sound Trucks Can Constitutionally Be Restricted
Sound trucks were a new technology used to an appreciable de-
gree in political campaigns in the late 1930's and early 1940's.' 35
Although candidates often savored the opportunity to broadcast their
messages quickly and cheaply from the streets directly to voters in
their homes, many citizens found the rolling campaign wagons and
their loud speakers disruptive of their peace and quiet. As a result,
some municipalities enacted ordinances restricting the use of sound
trucks within their city limits. 36
Trenton, New Jersey, was one of those cities. It enacted an or-
dinance prohibiting the use of sound trucks, calliopes or any similar
means of speech which emitted loud and raucous noises on the
streets of Trenton.13 Charles Kovacs subsequently used a sound
truck to comment on an ongoing labor dispute and was convicted of
violating the sound truck statute.' 38 His conviction was upheld by
the New Jersey Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court ac-
cepted certiorari to consider Kovacs' contention that the ordinance
violated his free speech rights.' 9
In what became the landmark loud speaker case, the Court up-
held the law as a valid manner restriction on speech which violated
the rights of Trenton residents to privacy in their homes.'" The
opinion recognized that the police power of a state "comprehends the
duty, within constitutional limitations, to protect the well-being and
134. Id. at 187.
135. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 81-82 (1949).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 78.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 87.
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tranquility of a community;" '14 1 and concluded that citizens relaxing
at home or trying to work in their offices needed the protection of the
ordinance, provided that:
The unwilling listener [exposed to loud sound trucks while
in their homes] is not like the passer-by who may be offered a
pamphlet in the street but cannot be made to take it. In his
home or on the street he is practically helpless to escape this
interference with his priacy by loud speakers except through
the protection of the municipality. 42
The Court held that "the need for reasonable protection in the
homes or business houses from the distracting noises of vehicles
equipped with such sound amplifying devices justifies the ordi-
nance"' 143 and affirmed Kovacs' conviction.
That very same need to protect people in their homes and of-
fices from disruptive and annoying speech which, because of the
means by which it is communicated, renders its targets helpless to
avoid the interference justifies protection against telemarketers. After
all, they penetrate the homes of unwilling listeners by means starkly
similar to those who sped through neighborhoods in the 1940's blar-
ing their spiels through loud speakers. The difference is that
telemarketers use one inch speakers which, ironically, are built right
in to the telephones people have purchased for their homes, eliminat-
ing the need for the solicitor to rent a sound truck to begin with.
C. The Picketing of Private Residences Can Be Constitutionally
Restricted
The Supreme Court's 1988 decision in Frisby v. Schultz 4 up-
held the constitutionality of a Brookfield, Wisconsin, ordinance
which banned picketing in residential neighborhoods. The city coun-
cil passed the law to protect the rights of home dwellers to "well-
being, tranquility, and privacy' 1 45 after residents complained about
anti-abortion protesters who had picketed the home of a Brookfield
abortion doctor.1
46
The ordinance survived the plaintiffs' First Amendment chal-
lenge and the Court's application of the strict scrutiny test reserved
141. Id. at 83.
142. Id. at 86-87.
143. Id. at 89.
144. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
145. Id. at 477.
146. Id. at 476-77.
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for "restrictions on speech in traditional public fora"' 47 because the
Justices were persuaded that the city's interest in protecting individ-
ual privacy in the home simply outweighed any free speech rights of
the plaintiffs to communicate their views in that manner:
The State's interest in protecting the well-being, tranquility,
and privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order in a
free and civilized society. Our prior decisions have often re-
marked on the unique nature of the home, the last citadel of the
tired, the weary, and the sick, and have recognized that
"[p]reserving the sanctity of the home, the one retreat to which
men and women can repair to escape from the tribulations of
their daily pursuits, is surely an important value.' 48
Of special concern to the Court in its decision was the protec-
tion of the right to privacy of the "unwilling listener:"
One important aspect of residential privacy is protection of the
unwilling listener. Although in many locations, we expect indi-
viduals simply to avoid speech they do not want to hear [cita-
tions] the home is different .... Instead, a special benefit of the
privacy all citizens enjoy within their own walls, which the
State may legislate to protect, is an ability to avoid intrusions.
Thus, we have repeatedly held that individuals are not required
to welcome unwanted speech into their own homes and that the
government may protect this freedom. [citations]149
Obviously, Frisby rejects most of the legal premises assumed by
those who elevate the free speech rights of telemarketers and dis-
count the privacy rights of people in their homes. It also unequivo-
cally recognizes the right of government to protect unwilling listeners
in their homes from speech they do not want to hear, and it is pre-
cisely that interest which. telemarketing regulation would similarly
ensure.
A contention could also be made that the telephone does not
constitute a traditional public forum for political speech, and that,
therefore, the rational basis standard should be applied to allow the
states wide First Amendment latitude in restricting the activities of
telemarketers. The Frisby decision is particularly significant in that
the city's ordinance survived the application of strict scrutiny, an
outcome which speaks forcefully to the weight the Court is currently
providing to the privacy rights of unwilling listeners in their own
147. Id. at 481.
148. Id. at 484 (citations omitted).
149. Id. at 484-85.
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homes, even as it relates to highly protected political speech.
D. Unsolicited Mail Can Constitutionally Be Restricted
The mail is also used as a means of in-home commercial solici-
tation. As direct merchandising evolved and as the technologies and
capabilities of the U.S. Postal Service improved, numerous major
businesses chose to contact home dwellers through the mail in order
to reach several thousands of prospective customers. The mail be-
came a seller's feast, as direct mail letters, catalogs and sweepstakes
invited tens of millions of recipients to buy products from their
homes. In fact, businesses spent more than $24 billion on direct mail
advertising in 1991 in an explosion of third-class mail.150
But not every business mailer sells welcomed merchandise.
Congress responded to the growing public concerns by enacting a
statute entitling a recipient to demand that a mailer cease providing
advertising which is offensive in its sexual explicitness. 1 Specifi-
cally, the Act permits a citizen to demand that the Postal Service
issue an order requiring that the mailer "refrain from further mail-
ings to the named addressees." '52
The constitutionality of that statute was challenged by several
publishers, mail order houses and mailing list brokers in Rowan v.
Post Office Department.53 The challengers contended that the re-
striction violated their free speech and due process rights, and that
the statute was vague, standardless and ambiguous. 54 In rejecting
those contentions, the Supreme Court first noted the legislative intent
upon which the law was predicated by noting that the "declared ob-
jective of Congress was to protect minors and the privacy of homes
from such material and to place the judgment of what constitutes an
offensive invasion of those interests in the hands of the addressee." '55
Further, the Court acknowledged that the law was "intended to
allow the addressee complete and unfettered discretion in electing
whether or not he desired to receive further material from a particu-
lar sender."1 '
150. Nancy Ryan, Marketers Are Playing Consumer Match Game, CHi. TRIB., Dec.
22, 1991, § 3, at 1.
151. Postal Revenue and Federal Salary Act of 1967, Title III, 81 Stat. 645, 39 U.S.C.
§ 3008 (1988).
152. Id. § 3008(b).
153. Rowan v. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1969).
154. Id. at 731.
155. Id. at 732.
156. Id at 734.
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Against those societal interests, then, the Court balanced the
commercial speech rights asserted by the challengers with the inter-
ests asserted by Congress and found that the law was not an uncon-
stitutional deprivation of the right to communicate, primarily be-
cause of the unique nature of the home:
In today's complex society we are inescapably captive audiences
for many purposes, but a sufficient measure of individual auton-
omy must survive to permit every householder to exercise con-
trol over unwanted mail .... Everyman's mail today is made up
overwhelmingly of material he did not seek from persons he
does not know. And all too often it is matter he finds
offensive."7
In specifically striking the balance in favor of householders'
rights to privacy, the Court reasoned:
[w]eighing the highly important right to communicate, but
without trying to determine where it fits into constitutional im-
peratives, against the very basic right to be free from sights,
sounds, and tangible matter we do not want, it seems to us that
a mailer's right to communicate must stop at the mailbox of an
unreceptive addressee." 8
And with language which has particularly persuasive applica-
tion to the issues discussed in this paper, the Court concluded:
Nothing in the Constitution compels us to listen to or view any
unwanted communication, whatever its merit .... The ancient
concept that "a man's home is his castle" into which "not even
the king may enter" has lost none of its vitality .... That we
are often "captives" outside the sanctuary of the home and sub-
ject to objectionable speech and other sound does not mean we
must be captives everywhere . . The asserted right of a
mailer, we repeat, stops at the outer boundary of every person's
domain.9
The Court's analysis in Rowan with respect to the constitu-
tional permissibility of restricting commercial speech in order to nur-
ture privacy in the home is consistent with the previous decisions
analyzed in this article which have considered other statutory limita-
tions on the evolving technologies of commercial communication.
Rowan is particularly compelling authority for the remedy proposed
herein because both the Postal Revenue and Federal Salary Act and
157. Id. at 736.
158. Id. at 736-37.
159. Id. at 737-38.
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the proposed telemarketing restriction act permit individuals to
choose and restrict the types of communications they wish to receive.
The limitation on the commercial speech right in each instance
would result from an affirmative act of the recipient giving notice
that he or she did not wish to be bothered by further communica-
tions from a particular source.
Arguably, an even stronger privacy case can be made on behalf
of home dwellers in the telemarketing context than on behalf of
home dwellers in the mail solicitation context. Specifically, telephone
soliciting is much more disruptive of a person's solitude than is the
receipt and inspection of junk mail which is undertaken at an indi-
vidual's leisure. Mail can also be simply discarded by a recipient
who doesn't wish to read particular advertising, a privilege not en-
joyed by a home dweller who runs to the phone on command of the
ubiquitous ringing that pierces his or her premises.
E. Broadcast Content Can Constitutionally Be Restricted
A salesperson's reach was exponentially expanded by the devel-
opment of radio and television broadcasting. Broadcasting has im-
pacted and often shaped most aspects of our lives; and it is undenia-
ble that it revolutionized American commerce. The actual truth is
that radio and television programming is the lure which draws audi-
ences near the audio and video hearths to subject them to commercial
messages from advertisers.
Television and radio broadcasting is a commercial boon. By
combining visual and audio impact, television broadcast commercials
can ignite immediate consumer demand for products advertised by
demonstrating them in the living rooms of millions of viewers, at
often less than a penny per household, becoming high-tech, cost effi-
cient substitutes for door-to-door salespeople. 6
Radio and television commercials indeed best represented tech-
nological advancement in commercial speech for most of the twenti-
eth century. And every inch of the way, from the 1920's and contin-
uing to the present, the law has kept pace and unstintingly imposed
a myriad of restrictions and limitations. So extensive is the regula-
tion of these means of commercial speech that Congress created the
Federal Radio Commission in 1927,161 the Federal Communications
160. O'rio KLEPPNER, ADVERTISING PROCEDURE 118 (1979); S. WATSON DUNN &
ARNOLD M. BARBAN, ADVERTISING-Ihs ROLE IN MODERN MARKETING 513 (1974).
161. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213 (1943).
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Commission in 1934,62 and delegated the specific regulation of
broadcast advertising to the FCC and the Federal Trade
Commission.16
Industry challenges to such extensive regulation, typically on
First Amendment grounds, have been routinely rejected by the
courts. As early as 1943, the Supreme Court affirmed statutes and
regulations which restricted and limited the free speech rights of
broadcasters. 64 The Court subsequently refined its analysis of the
regulation of broadcasting as the technology of broadcasting itself
achieved increased sophistication. By 1976, the Court was again
faced with a free speech challenge to a statute which restricted
broadcast speech, and in a seminal decision, affirmed the regulation
on grounds which are relevant to the privacy implications of
telemarketing.
In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,6 6 the Court considered
whether the FCC had the power to regulate a radio broadcast which
was merely "indecent" but not "obscene."'' Framed in First
Amendment terms, the question confronted by the Court was
whether the First Amendment denied government the power to re-
strict the broadcasting of indecent language in any circumstances. 1
67
The controversy arose as a result of the broadcast by a radio station
in New York state of a recording of a George Carlin monologue
which contained the "seven dirty words" which Carlin joked were
never supposed to be broadcast and which included words which ex-
plicitly described sexual and excretory functions in street vernacular
terms." 8 The Pacifica Foundation, which operated the radio station
which broadcast the monologue, vigorously argued that the FCC had
acted improperly in punishing the monologue's broadcast and that
the underlying indecency statute was an unconstitutional content re-
striction of free speech. 6
The Supreme Court upheld the FCC's action and validated the
statute criminalizing indecent language on radio and television., 7 0
The Court had little difficulty categorizing the Carlin monologue as
162. 48 Stat. 1064 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.)
163. See 15 U.S.C. § 41; 47 U.S.C. § 301; Liaison Agreement, 3 C.C.H. Trade Reg.
Rep. § 9852 (Apr. 27, 1972).
164. National Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S. at 226.
165. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
166. Id. at 729.
167. Id. at 744.
168. Id. at 729, 751.
169. Id. at 742, 744.
170. Id. at 738, 742.
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indecent and it then upheld the constitutionality of the regulation of
broadcast indecency."' In so doing, it noted that not all media of
expression enjoy the same constitutional protection and that "it is
broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amendment
protection."' 72 The Court explained that the reason broadcast speech
can be restricted more than other forms of expression is, iri part,
because such speech "confronts the citizen, not only in public, but
also in the privacy of the home, where the individual's right to be let
alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an
intruder."' 73
And, with reasoning that speaks persuasively to the precise ar-
gument which is advanced by those opposing the regulation of
telemarketers' calls, the Court rejoined:
To say that one may avoid further offense by turning off the
radio when he hears indecent language is like saying that the
remedy for an assault is to run away after the first blow. One
may hahg up on an indecent phone call, but that option does
not give the caller a constitutional immunity or avoid a harm
that has already taken place.1"
While the specific harm to which the Supreme Court referred
in the context of indecent phone calls is not typically duplicated in
calls made by telemarketers, fraud and other harms are so impli-
cated. And Congress has boldly acted to eliminate abuses by tele-
phone and provide remedies to people who are harassed by telephone
callers. By statute, debt collectors are prohibited from "plac[ing] of
telephone calls without meaningful disclosure of the caller's iden-
tity; ' "'7 and "engaging any person in telephone conversation repeat-
edly or continuously with the intent to annoy, abuse, or harass any
person at the called number."'76
To be sure, limitations can be placed on the content of speech
broadcast to peoples' homes for the reasons enumerated in Pacifica,
particularly in order to protect the privacy rights of people in their
homes. And the analogy could not be more perfect to the present case
because particularly salient to the Court's holding in Pacifica was
that the Carlin monologue was offensive to a person who did not
171. Id. at 741, 744.
172. Id. at 748.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 748-49.
175. Consumer Credit Protection Act Amendments, 91 Stat. 877, 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(6)
(1988).
176. Id. § 1692d(5).
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want to receive it. And the remedy the Court embraced was not to
place the burden on the recipient to avoid the unwanted speech, but
to limit the speaker by imposing time and place restrictions on the
speech.
F. Telemarketing Can Constitutionally Be Restricted
Telemarketing, like each of the means developed before it, is yet
another method to solicit sales from people in their homes. It is as-
suredly futuristic, high-tech and fiber-optic, but it remains commer-
cial speech, with limited constitutional protection.
And while some members of Congress and the telemarketing
industry protest that calling restrictions would violate free speech
rights, the courts are slowly beginning to address those constitutional
questions in the precise context of telemarketing as the latest sales
technology.
In National Funeral Services, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 7 the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of a
West Virginia statute which extensively regulated the sale of "pre-
need" funeral services in that state. Specifically, one provision pro-
hibits both the in-person and telephone solicitation of prospective
buyers of those funeral services if the targeted consumers reside in a
nursing home, a hospital or a private residence."1 8 As the court ex-
plained, such restrictions were enacted "in an attempt to reduce
fraud and preserve privacy, ''1 7 and "that the West Virginia Legisla-
ture considers these contracts [contracts for such services signed by
people in those locations and, within the reach of another provision
of the Act, contracts signed with the relatives of persons near death]
to be a threat to the consuming public." 8 '
The statute was challenged by National Funeral Services, Inc.,
a West Virginia corporation which sold "pre-need" funeral services,
on the ground, that it violated the seller's First Amendment free
speech rights. While the petitioners sought review only of the "in-
home" solicitation restriction, the court additionally reached the mer-
its of the restriction on telephone sales. Particularly, the challengers
argued that the statute was content-based and an abridgment of le-
177. National Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Rockefeller, 870 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 966 (1989); see also Guardian Plans, Inc. v. Teague, 870 F.2d 123 (4th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989).
178. W. VA. CoDE § 47-14-10 (1983).




gitimate commercial speech. 81
In its analysis, the court first noted the law that governs cases
involving restrictions on commercial speech. It emphasized the well-
settled tenets,
[t]hat the Constitution accords less protection to commercial
speech than to other constitutionally safeguarded forms of ex-
pression .. . that the potential for deception and invasion of
privacy inherent in some forms of commercial speech can, and
has, justified content-based restrictions ...[that] these restric-
tions can certainly be based on the place and manner of the
expression . . .and that if the content of the speech or its
method of solicitation might be "inherently misleading or when
experience has proved that in fact such advertising is subject to
abuse, the States may impose appropriate restrictions. '1 82
As well, the court's analysis of the challenged statute was
guided by the four-part test enunciated in Central Hudson Gas v.
Public Service Commission of New York,' 83 which requires that de-
terminations be made concerning whether the challenged regulation
is more extensive than necessary to meet the substantial governmen-
tal interests for which it was enacted.184
The court concluded that while the funeral services solicitation
was protected by the First Amendment, West Virginia had nonethe-
less articulated substantial interest in support of its restrictions on
"pre-need" funeral services solicitation. Specifically, the interests rec-
ognized by the court were those of protecting consumers from high
pressure sales tactics at a point of vulnerability and ensuring the pri-
vacy of the home.' 8 5 As Circuit Judge Hall saw it:
The discussion of the death of a family member can be a disqui-
eting experience when done with a loved one, let alone when
done with a perfect stranger who uninvitedly knocks on your
door, or calls on your phone. I believe that West Virginia's ban
on solicitation is supported by the substantial interest of protect-
ing privacy.' 8'
With specific reference to the statute's restriction on telephone
solicitation, the judge found that telemarketing invited fraud and de-
ceptive sales practices, that it offered sales people the opportunity to
181. Id. at 140.
182. Id. at 141-42 (citations omitted).
183. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 142-43.
186. Id. at 143.
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overreach and that the intrusiveness of such calls was particularly
pronounced because it invaded the privacy of the home by forcing
the recipient to answer the call, confront the solicitor and rid them-
selves of the caller.1
8 7
The court was also satisfied that West Virginia had acted rea-
sonably and that its restrictions did not exceed what was necessary to
protect the governmental interests at stake. It was persuaded that
since only uninvited in-person solicitation and telemarketing were
made unlawful, all the other means of communication were left open
to those who sold "pre-need" funeral services, including the use of
the mails and every other form of advertising."' 8
In the final analysis, the court held that the challenged statute
satisfied the four-part Central Hudson test and was a constitutional
exercise of the state's police powers to protect the privacy of the
home and to guard against consumer fraud. The opinion concluded
with the observation that "this presents a textbook case of the appro-
priate restraint of commercial speech. '1 8 9
This was a textbook case because West Virginia restricted only
the place and manner of the speech involved, preserved the speaker's
right to advertise its product and solicit sales in a variety of other
ways, and furthered valid state interests in the protection of personal
privacy and in preventing fraudulent conduct.
But the analysis and reasoning relied upon by the court of ap-
peals upholding West Virginia's action applies with full and persua-
sive force here because the whole case turns on the court's recogni-
tion that telemarketing and in-person home solicitation are forms of
commercial speech. And as such, they enjoy lesser First Amendment
protection and can be regulated by the state to protect the privacy of
the home in the same way that the other forms of selling discussed in
this section have been regulated as the technology of sales has
advanced.
X. REQUIRING THE BLOCKING OF TELEMARKETING CALLS
WOULD BE A VALID TIME, PLACE AND MANNER RESTRICTION
ON COMMERCIAL SPEECH
The regulators, legislators and telemarketing industry repre-
sentatives who argue that meaningful restrictions on telemarketing
would be unconstitutional are dead wrong. And the authority for
187. Id. at 144.
188. Id. at 145.
189. Id. at 146.
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that statement is that every decision previously cited in this article
has upheld limitations on door-to-door solicitation, sound trucks,
picketing, unsolicited mailings and broadcast programs in order to
protect the privacy rights of home dwellers. Public policy decision-
makers must understand and be guided by such a compelling wall of
precedent.
As well, those decision-makers must be educated on two impor-
tant and basic tenets of constitutional law which inform the debate
on telemarketing restrictions.
A. Telemarketing Is Commercial Speech and It Can Be Regulated
Many individuals manifest a simplistic, Pavlovian reaction to
any law which limits speech. They simply accept as an article of
faith that any restriction would be an unconstitutional abridgment of
the speaker's First Amendment rights. However, the Court has con-
sistently provided commercial speech, such as telemarketing, with
limited First Amendment protection.19° Even content-based restric-
tions can be imposed on commercial speech to protect against inva-
sion of privacy and consumer deception.191 Of course, the proposal
offered here is content neutral and even less potentially offensive to
the First Amendment.
As the Supreme Court has emphasized: "we instead have af-
forded commercial speech a limited measure of protection, commen-
surate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment
values, while allowing modes of regulation that might be impermissi-
ble in the realm of non commercial expression."' 92
It was, after all, the commercial nature of the speech in all of
the home sales cases analyzed previously which allowed the restric-
tions at issue to be upheld by the courts. The Supreme Court has
defined commercial speech as expression which "does no more than
propose a commercial transaction.""'n Telemarketing easily meets
that definition, is therefore commercial speech, and can lawfully be
restricted in the manner in which this article proposes.
This is not to imply that commercial speech is valueless and
without First Amendment protection. In its seminal Central Hudson
190. Posadas de Puerto Rico Ass'n v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 340 (1986); Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1983).
191. See Curtis v. Thompson, 840 F.2d 1291, 1298 (7th Cir. 1988).
192. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
193. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 762 (1975).
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Gas and Electric Corp. opinion,19' the Supreme Court recognized
the worth of commercial speech in serving not only the economic
interest of the speaker, but also assisting consumers to be better in-
formed about products that they are comparing or buying. 9 In Cen-
tral Hudson, the Court held that the constitutional protection avail-
able for particular commercial speech turned on the nature both of
the expression and of the governmental interests served by its regula-
tion,"' and enunciated a four-part test as the appropriate analytical
calculus to be used in commercial speech cases.197 The essence of the
Central Hudson test is that any restriction on commercial speech
may be no more extensive than is necessary to meet the stated gov-
ernmental interest. And while the record in Central Hudson failed
to establish that the challenged total ban on all advertising promot-
ing the use of electricity met that requirement, 98 the telemarketing
proposal here can be easily distinguished since it protects residential
privacy without banning all telemarketing calls. Under the proposal,
only those calls to unwilling recipients would be restricted.
The voluntary opt-out option, which leaves telemarketers free to
call willing recipients, avoids the constitutional infirmity which the
Supreme Court has found in other regulations of commercial speech
which have involved total suppression. In its 1977 decision in Carey
v. Population Services International,99 the Court invalidated a
New York statute that criminalized the advertisement or display of
contraceptives, reasoning that a state may not completely suppress
the dissemination of truthful commercial information. 00 As well, the
Court's holding in Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better
Environment"' that a blanket ban on door-to-door charitable solici-
tation by organizations not using at least seventy five percent of their
receipts for charitable purposes is overbroad and unconstitutional, is
also avoided here. The Schaumburg Court allowed that a city may
enact regulations to serve its legitimate interests, but that it must do
so with narrowly tailored limitations that do not interfere with First
Amendment rights.2"2 In quoting from its 1963 decision in NAACP
194. Central Hudson Gas and Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980).
195. Id. at 561-62.
196. Id. at 563.
197. Id. at 566.
198. Id. at 572.
199. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
200. Id. at 700.
201. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
202. Id. at 637.
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v. Button,"' the Court reiterated that "[blroad prophylactic rules in
the rules of free expression are suspect. Precision of regulation must
be the touchstone . *.". ."'0 Applying those general rules, the Court
concluded that the Schaumburg ordinance did not survive scrutiny
under the First Amendment because of its breadth.20 5
Tellingly, the Schaumburg ordinance not only prohibited door-
to-door charitable solicitation but also made such solicitations unlaw-
ful on the city's public streets,2"' thus effectively depriving charitable
solicitors of any other avenues of communication. One can readily
distinguish the proposed telemarketing restriction on the bases that it
is not an overbroad, total ban on this commercial speech, but also the
weight of the governmental interest in privacy is stronger and much
more persuasive because since Schaumburg's ban applied to solicita-
tion not only on the doorsteps of the city but also on all of its streets,
it could not assert as compelling a residential privacy interest. The
Supreme Court found Schaumburg's proffered justification for the
ban inadequate to outweigh the speakers' free speech rights."0 7 That
insufficiency is avoided by the proposed telemarketing restriction by
a narrowly focused restriction which protects only the residential
privacy of those seeking such protection, and which allows
telemarketers access to every other means of available advertising.
This proposal also satisfies the teaching of a third major Su-
preme Court case which invalidated a restriction on commercial
speech. In its 1983 decision in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products
Corp.,2"8 the Court invalidated a statute which prohibited the mail-
ing of advertisements for contraceptives. The purpose of the statute
was to allow parents to control the information their children re-
ceived about birth control and to shield recipients from information
that they might find offensive.20 9 Reasoning that potential offensive-
ness is no justification for a blanket prohibition on commercial
speech,210 the Court invalidated the law as an unnecessarily "sweep-
ing prohibition"2"' on contraceptive advertising. Again, such consti-
tutional infirmity is avoided here because rather than the government
making a blanket determination that everyone would be offended by
203. Id. (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
204. Id. (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
205. Id. at 639.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 636.
208. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
209. Id. at 71.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 72.
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telemarketing calls to their homes, and therefore would not want to
receive them, this proposal leaves to the individual home dweller the
right to make that decision, thereby avoiding impermissible
overbreadth.
B. Valid Time, Place and Manner Restriction Can Be Imposed on
Telemarketing
All classes of protected speech, including commercial speech, are
subject to reasonable time, place and manner restrictions."21 Such
limitations are considered reasonable if they are content neutral, nar-
rowly tailored to serve a legitimate governmental interest and leave
open ample alternative channels for communication of the restricted
information.2 13 Each of these requirements is easily satisfied by the
proposed restriction on telemarketing activities.
The telemarketing regulation offered is, by definition, content
neutral in that the restriction is not related to the content of the
speech.214 As the Supreme Court has sharply warned, "government
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas,
its subject matter, or its content." '215 This regulation would involve
no inquiry into the content of any telemarketing call and no distinc-
tion would be made between commercial and non commercial calls.
Telephone calls selling products and services would be treated the
same as those seeking charitable or political contributions. They all
similarly invade a home dweller's privacy, and the proposed regula-
tion also treats them the same. As well, the content of the message
would in no way be regulated; rather, it is the place of the communi-
cation which would be restricted. In all of these ways, then, this pro-
posal would avoid violating the doctrine of content neutrality.
The regulation proposed here has been narrowly tailored to
meet the legitimate governmental interest in residential privacy and
thus satisfies the second test of reasonableness. This is no broad,
blanket prohibition of all telemarketing calls since it eliminates no
more than the evils it seeks to remedy. The only calls prohibited by
the proposal would be those made to the homes and businesses of
unwilling recipients. Thus, it would be difficult to fashion a nar-
212. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 771 (1975).
213. Central Hudson Gas and Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 568
(1980); see also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771; Grayned v. City of Rock-
ford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
214. Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 78.
215. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
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rower regulation of telemarketing solicitation. As well, the causal
link between the restriction and the insulation of certain homes from.
telemarketing calls would be direct and certain. Implementation of
the regulation would, therefore, eliminate calls to those not wishing
to receive them. And as to the remaining component of the analytical
equation, the time has long since passed when anyone could deny the
interest of the state in ensuring the privacy of its residents in their
homes. The validity of such an interest has been recognized for de-
cades by the Supreme Court.21
The final reasonableness test is readily met by this proposal,
too, as it is undeniable that numerous alternative channels remain
open for the communication of the information conveyed by the calls
to the homes "opting out." Included would be the mail, radio and
television advertising, and newspaper and magazine advertising.
To be upheld by the courts, time, place and manner restrictions
must not discriminate either on their face or in their application.2 17
As this proposed regulation applies to all telemarketing calls, com-
mercial, charitable and political, equally and regardless of content or
source, no discrimination would result.
. XI. CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to rebut the conventional belief of
most legislators and regulators that the First Amendment prohibits
restrictions on telemarketing activities. It has argued that a home
dweller's right of privacy outweighs any telemarketer's commercial
speech rights and that the telemarketing debate must finally be
placed in its correct constitutional context.
The Congress, and regulators, have been mired for years in at-
tempting to answer the question of where to draw the line as to
which telemarketing calls should be restricted and which should not.
This article has suggested an alternative which would allow private
citizens to draw it for themselves by being authorized to inform their
telephone providers that they want telemarketing calls blocked from
their line. Such legislation would be effective and constitutional.
216. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 470-71 (1980); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. 726, 749 n.27 (1978); Erzonznick v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975);
Rowan v. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1969); Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 118
(1969); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
217. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 639
(1980); Citizens for a Better Environment v. Village of Olympia Fields, 511 F. Supp. 104, 108
(N.D. 111. 1980); Connecticut Citizens Action Group v. Town of Southington, 508 F. Supp.
43, 47 (D. Conn. 1980).
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